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Abstract
Over nine million jobs were furloughed in the United Kingdom during the
coronavirus pandemic. Using real-time survey evidence from the UK in April
and May 2020, we document which workers were most likely to be furloughed
and we analyse variation in the terms on which they furloughed. We find that
women were significantly more likely to be furloughed. Inequality in care
responsibilities seems to have played a key role: mothers were 10 percentage
points more likely than fathers to initiate the decision to be furloughed (as
opposed to it being fully or mostly the employer’s decision) but we find
no such gender gap amongst childless workers. The prohibition of working
whilst furloughed was routinely ignored, especially by men who can do a
large percentage of their work tasks from home. Women were less likely to
have their salary topped up beyond the 80 per cent subsidy paid for by the
*
Submitted August 2020.
Ethics approval was obtained from the Central University Research Ethics Committee (CUREC) of the
University of Oxford: ECONCIA20-21-09. We are grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council
(UKRI grant number ES/V004042/1), the University of Oxford, the University of Zurich, the Cambridge
INET, and the Cambridge Keynes Fund for generous financial support, and Marlis Schneider for excellent
research assistance. This work has been supported by the Nuffield Foundation via the IFS Deaton Review,
‘Inequality in the Twenty-First Century’ (reference WEL/43603).
Keywords: COVID-19, coronavirus, crisis, recession, short-time work, furlough, inequality.
JEL classification numbers: J21, J22, J24, J33, J63.
© 2020 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
592 Fiscal Studies
government. Considering the future, furloughed workers without employer-
provided sick pay have a lower willingness to pay to return to work, as do those
in sales and food preparation occupations. Compared with non-furloughed
employees, furloughed workers are more pessimistic about keeping their job
in the short to medium run and are more likely to be actively searching for a
new job, even when controlling for detailed job characteristics. These results
have important implications for the design of short-time work schemes and the
strategy for effectively reopening the economy.
I. Introduction
The coronavirus outbreak has brought about a severe economic recession.
With lockdown measures and business closures in place to contain the spread
of the virus, many businesses have seen their activities coming to a halt. This
has led to a sharp rise in unemployment rates in many countries affected
by the coronavirus pandemic. To counteract the economic consequences
of the current crisis and to partially shield workers from the economic
downturn, many countries have introduced or expanded existing furloughing
or short-time work (STW) schemes.1 In the UK, the government launched the
Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) on 20 April 2020. The scheme
allows employers to furlough workers for a minimum of three weeks, with the
government contributing 80 per cent of employees’ salaries. By 14 June 2020,
more than nine million jobs had been furloughed under the CJRS, for a total
value of claims of more than £20 billion.2
While a third of UK employees have been enrolled in the CJRS, little is
known about the operation and effectiveness of the policy. It is thus difficult
to assess when the scheme should optimally end, and the degree to which
furloughing should feature in the policy response to any future waves of
infection. Further, the CJRS leaves a lot of room for employer discretion in
the terms on which workers are furloughed. Whether the exercise of such
discretion is reducing or exacerbating existing dimensions of labour market
inequality is important for the design of policies to support the economic
recovery.
In this paper, we use survey data that we collected on two independent
samples of workers to shed light on the operation of the UK furloughing
scheme. We find large variation in the share of workers that have been
furloughed across, but also within, occupations and industries. Women have
been significantly more likely to be furloughed than men doing the same type
of job. There is evidence that childcare responsibilities play an important role
in explaining this gender gap. Mothers are 10 percentage points more likely
1Giupponi and Landais, 2020.
2Source: HMRC coronavirus (COVID-19) statistics.
© 2020 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
Furloughing 593
than fathers to have initiated the decision to be furloughed, as opposed to the
decision being ‘fully’ or ‘mostly’ the employer’s decision, when controlling
for a rich set of job characteristics. However, we find no gender gap in the
furlough decision amongst childless workers.
We find that ‘not all workers are furloughed equally’, and we document
differences in the terms under which workers are put on furlough, including
whether employers have agreed to top-up their employees’ salaries beyond the
state contribution. Women and those on low incomes are less likely to have
had their wages topped up beyond the 80 per cent provided by the government.
We find that the majority of workers have continued to do some work while
furloughed without being formally rotated back into employment. Amongst
furloughed workers who can do at least 50 per cent of their job from home,
only 17 per cent report working zero hours and their work hours are only 25
per cent lower than they were in February.3
Finally, we examine workers’ expectations about future unemployment.
We find that workers’ perceived probability of losing their job before
August is 28 per cent, but that furloughed workers perceive a 15 percentage
point higher likelihood of job loss in the coming months. We also show
that more pessimistic expectations increase on-the-job search, and that
having been furloughed further increases the probability of job search by 3
percentage points.
Our results have important implications for the design of the UK
furloughing scheme, and STW policies more broadly. First, STW schemes
should allow employees to work on a part-time basis. Indeed, it is odd that
the UK scheme originally ruled out this possibility, given that such flexibility
is a key reason to prefer STW schemes over recall unemployment. It is very
rare for workers to report that they can do precisely zero of their work tasks
from home,4 and the majority of workers have continued to do some work
while on furlough. Perversely, firms breaking the terms of the scheme in this
way have likely been welfare-improving, although it has introduced horizontal
inequity between compliers and non-compliers; firms will have had more
flexibility in maintaining essential business activities and the rate of human
capital depreciation should have slowed.
The duration of support is a crucial parameter of STW schemes. These
policies should be active long enough to prevent inefficient layoffs from firms
in temporary hardship. However, they should not subsidise low-productivity
matches indefinitely and thereby hinder efficient labour market reallocation.5
Our results suggest that there is another dimension to consider. Crucially, the
3These figures exclude furloughed employees who said they were being formally rotated back into work
by their employer.
4Adams-Prassl et al., 2020b.
5Giupponi and Landais, 2020.
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duration of the furloughing scheme should be sensitive to continued disruption
in schooling and childcare. Mothers have been more likely to request to be
furloughed. There is a real risk that these women could be forced out of the
labour market if the furloughing scheme ends without viable childcare options
being available. Our results also suggest the need for flexibility in the removal
of the scheme across different occupations. Furloughed workers who can do a
large proportion of their jobs from home are relatively pessimistic about their
chance of keeping their job. For these workers, social-distancing measures are
unlikely to be the only reason for a low-productivity match and they should
not be prevented from moving to more viable firms.
Finally, a return to work outside the home provides more opportunities for
catching and transmitting the virus. We find wide variation in the willingness
to return to work from furlough. Workers without access to employer-provided
sick pay have significantly lower willingness to pay to return to work from
furlough. Worryingly, we find that workers without sick pay are significantly
more likely to continue to work with mild coronavirus symptoms. The UK
has one of the least generous statutory sick pay schemes in Europe, which
was described as ‘manifestly inadequate’ by the European Committee of
Social Rights (2017). Our results suggest that the provision of more generous
sick pay could help to support the economic recovery by encouraging
workers to return to work while infection rates remain above zero, and
supporting sick workers to take time off work when they pose a risk to
others.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it contributes
to the literature on the importance of STW schemes to buffer economic
shocks6 and to the growing body of literature documenting the immediate
economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic in the UK.7 Other research
using data collected before the crisis has discussed channels through which
the current crisis may affect workers differently depending on their gender
and occupation.8 Our results are consistent with Andrew et al. (2020), who
also find big differences in the labour supply of mothers and fathers over
the pandemic. Finally, our paper contributes to the literature on the positive
externalities arising from sick pay coverage.9 We show that even amid the
pandemic, when the importance of social distancing and self-isolation was
particularly salient, workers without sick pay were significantly more likely to
work when sick and that workers without sick pay are less willing to return to
work from furlough.
6See, for example, Giupponi and Landais (2020), Cahuc, Kramarz and Nevoux (2018) and Kopp and
Siegenthaler (2018).
7See, for example, Blundell et al. (2020), Benzeval et al. (2020) and Piyapromdee and Spittal (2020).
8Alon et al., 2020; Dingel and Neiman, 2020; Mongey and Weinberg, 2020.
9Pichler and Ziebarth, 2020; Marie and Vall Castelló, 2020; Adams-Prassl et al., 2020a.
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II. Institutional features and design choices
1. Policy motivation
STW schemes subsidise labour hoarding by firms. They allow firms to reduce
employees’ hours rather than firing them, with the government stepping
in to smooth workers’ salaries. STW schemes have been a key pillar of
countercyclical policy in several countries for many years. Germany, for
example, has one of the oldest and most comprehensive STW programmes
in the world.10 The German Kurzarbeit scheme allows firms to reduce their
employees’ hours for up to 12 months. The government replaces 60 per cent
of forgone net monthly earnings (up to a cap) for single workers in order to
shield them from the financial impact of the fall in hours.11 Similar schemes
exist in many other European countries and in some US states.12
Why implement a STW policy rather than insuring workers directly
through unemployment insurance schemes? STW schemes aim to preserve
worker–firm matches in the face of temporary negative shocks; firm-specific
human capital and hiring costs mean that it can be efficient to keep a
worker–firm match intact in periods of low productivity. However, liquidity
constraints and/or commitment issues limit the degree to which firms can do
this in practice.13 This provides a role for governments to subsidise labour
hoarding and reduce inefficient layoffs. While firms can fire workers and rehire
them when business conditions improve, commitments to recall workers are
generally not credible. In their model, Gregory, Menzio and Wiczer (2020)
emphasise the importance of furloughing to avoid job ties being cut for
workers who could take years to find stable jobs. STW schemes also allow
much more flexibility than so-called temporary or recall unemployment;
most STW schemes allow employees to work on a part-time basis, helping
to maintain essential business activities and preventing depreciation of
human capital.
In an aggregate crisis, STW schemes can relieve the public administration
of some of the burden of allocating funds quickly to those in need. In the
US, for instance, the reports of long delays in payments and long queues
in front of public offices during the COVID-19 pandemic are plentiful.14 As
10Short-time work dates back to 1910 when it was first used in the mining industry.
11The usual replacement rate is 67 per cent for employees with children. During the COVID-19
pandemic, the replacement rate has been increased to 70 per cent (or 77 per cent for employees with
children) for those working half-time from the fourth month onwards, and to 80 per cent (or 87 per cent for
employees with children) from the seventh month onwards.
12See Schulten and Müller (2020) for differences in the regulations across European countries. Some US
states also have short-time compensation (STC) schemes. STC programmes are implemented at the state
level and there are differences among state programmes.
13Giupponi and Landais, 2020.
14See, for instance, Rosenberg (2020).
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STW schemes can operate directly through employers, applications can be
coordinated around a smaller number of agents and the paperwork burden on
workers can be minimised.
To evaluate the overall effects of STW schemes, there are several factors to
consider. First, does the scheme reduce inefficient separations? Evidence from
the Great Recession suggests that some STW policies can have large positive
effects on employment: Giupponi and Landais (2020) and Cahuc, Kramarz
and Nevoux (2018) exploit variation in eligibility rules to show that the Italian
and French STW schemes, respectively, have strong positive employment
effects on liquidity-constrained firms. However, the devil is in the details;
schemes must likely provide timely payments and extend for the duration of
the shock if liquidity-constrained firms are to retain workers into a downturn.
It is also important to consider whether all types of labour are covered by
the scheme, in order to prevent inefficient substitution between different
workers.
Second, how large are moral hazard effects? Moral hazard can take many
forms in this context. Firms might take advantage of the scheme by requiring
workers to put in their usual hours with their wages subsidised by the state. In
the present crisis, this is more likely to be a pressing issue in occupations where
working from home is easier. Evidence of significant downturns in production
as a condition for wage subsidies could help limit such behaviour and is
used in practice in some countries (e.g. Germany). Alternatively, firms may
accept subsidies and still lay off workers. Take-up should, therefore, be made
conditional on retaining workers; the precise terms in which this obligation is
made varies across countries.15
Third, do STW schemes prevent workers from moving to higher-
productivity firms? By subsidising lower-productivity matches, STW schemes
could prevent workers from leaving failing firms quickly and thus hinder
efficient labour market reallocation. Giupponi and Landais (2020) show that
this effect is especially important for persistent shocks. In the present context,
this question cannot be evaluated at this stage, given that the pandemic remains
active and the persistence of the downturn remains unknown.
Finally, many schemes leave room for firm discretion regarding how to
allocate reductions of hours across their workforce, whether wages should
be topped up beyond government subsidies, and the removal of non-wage
work benefits. As far as we are aware, there is no existing evidence on
heterogeneity in the terms on which workers are enrolled in STW schemes.
The consequence of employer discretion on these margins for labour market
outcomes is an empirical question that we hope to shed light on in this
paper.
15Schulten and Müller, 2020.
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2. The UK Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme
In the UK, on 20 March 2020 the government announced a new STW
scheme to protect jobs – the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS).
The operation and expected duration of the scheme have been continuously
revised over the crisis. It closed to new applications on 30 June 2020.16
There are two particularly noteworthy features compared with other European
STW schemes: tight restrictions on flexible working and uncertainty over the
duration and generosity of the scheme.
The UK scheme initially placed severe restrictions on work for enrolled
employees. Until 1 July 2020, workers on the scheme had to be furloughed
and do no work for their employer for at least three weeks in each four-week
period.17 In return, the government paid 80 per cent of employees’ wages, up to
a maximum of £2,500 per month. This stands in contrast to the STW schemes
in Italy, France and Germany, which allowed for flexible reductions in hours. In
principle, flexible reductions in hours seem preferable as a minimum number
of hours may be necessary to sustain critical business operations and to prevent
depreciation of individual and firm-specific human capital.
On 12 June, the UK scheme was revised to permit ‘flexible furloughing’
from the beginning of July. From 1 July, employers have been able to bring
furloughed employees back to work and claim subsidies for typical hours not
worked by an employee (with employers paying for hours that are worked).
However, note that this arrangement is only available for workers who were
previously ‘fully’ furloughed. The introduction of short-time work within the
scheme was previously announced to be available from 1 August but was
brought forward by a month to facilitate a return to work with the easing
of lockdown measures. From 1 August, employers are also required to make
gradually increasing contributions towards labour costs.18
As this discussion highlights, firms have faced considerable uncertainty
about the length, generosity and design of the UK scheme. When announced,
the UK scheme was guaranteed to last for four months, until the end of June
2020. At the time of writing, the scheme has been extended until the end
16From 30 June onwards, employers were only able to furlough employees that they had furloughed for
a full three-week period at any time between 1 March and 30 June 2020. Thus, the final date by which an
employer could have furloughed an employee for the first time was 10 June 2020.
17An employee could be furloughed and do no work for three weeks, and then be brought off furlough
to work for the employer for a one-week period before potentially being put back on furlough. However,
furloughed employees can take on a new job with a different employer, provided this is permitted by their
contract of employment in general.
18In August, the government contribution towards the employee’s pay when on furlough remains at 80 per
cent but employers are required to pay employer national insurance and pension contributions. In September,
employers are also required to pay 10 per cent of wages and the government contributes 70 per cent. In
October, the employer contribution increases to 20 per cent with the government contribution falling to 60
per cent.
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of October. It remains unclear whether the scheme will operate beyond this
point, and if so, under what terms. It is also worth noting the initial delay
in payments. While the scheme was announced in late March, the portal to
facilitate payments to firms did not open until the end of April.
III. Data
To study variation in the characteristics of workers furloughed, and
heterogeneity in the terms under which they have been furloughed, we
collected real-time survey data on large geographically representative samples
of UK workers.19 The data were collected by a professional survey company;
all participants were part of the company’s online panel and participated in
the survey online.20 We collected two waves of survey data that included
detailed information on furloughing. The first wave of data (N = 4,931) was
collected on 9–11 April 2020 (approximately two weeks after the introduction
of lockdown measures in the UK). The second wave (N = 4,009) was collected
on 20–21 May 2020.21 To be eligible to participate in the study, participants
had to be resident in the UK, be at least 18 years old, and report having
engaged in any paid work during the previous 12 months. While our surveys
targeted individuals who were or had been engaged in any type of paid
work, including self-employment, in the analysis we restrict the sample to
respondents who reported being in paid work in February 2020, and who were
(had been) employees in their main (last) job.
The samples were selected to be representative in terms of region.
Table A.1 in the online Appendix shows the distribution of respondents
across regions in the UK and the comparison with the national distribution of
individuals across the different regions, separately for each survey wave. As
can be seen from this table, the distributions are very similar. We compare the
characteristics of the respondents in our sample to a nationally representative
sample of the economically active population in the UK. Table A.2 shows
the demographic characteristics of our samples and of economically active
workers in the Labour Force Survey (LFS) in the second quarter of 2019.
1. Economic activity and furloughing
In our surveys, we asked respondents about the number of jobs they had in
February 2020 and in the week before the survey date. Respondents were
asked to think about jobs they had other than completing surveys and were
19Online Appendix C includes the questionnaire.
20The survey was scripted in the online survey software Qualtrics. Participants received modest
incentives for completing the survey.
21We deliberately chose to survey new participants in the second survey wave (i.e. there are no
participants who participated in the survey more than once).
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told to count jobs from which they were furloughed as a job. Respondents
who worked at least one job in February were then asked for their typical
weekly hours in February. Respondents who had at least one job in the survey
reference week were asked how many hours they worked last week.
Workers who had at least one job in the week before data collection were
asked detailed questions about their main job, including whether they were
furloughed.22 Note that we asked all employees if they had been furloughed;
that is, we did not condition this question on whether a respondent reported
zero work hours last week to allow us to analyse compliance with the terms of
the CJRS. This is in contrast to some other UK labour market surveys, which
have conditioned their question about furloughing on a report of zero work
hours in the survey reference week.23
2. Furloughing terms
We collected information on the terms under which workers have been
furloughed. In the April survey, we asked respondents whether their employer
had topped up their wage beyond the 80 per cent paid by the government. We
also collected information on whether employers were still asking respondents
to work, distinguishing between those who were being formally rotated back
into work and those who were being asked to work in violation of the terms of
the scheme.24
In our May survey, we asked questions about whether the worker or their
employer made the decision to go on furlough and whether a respondent
wanted to return to work. Specifically, we asked about the degree to which
furlough was the employer’s or respondent’s decision on a five-point scale
ranging from ‘Fully [the employer’s] decision’ to ‘Fully [the respondent’s]
decision’. Respondents who were currently furloughed in the May survey were
also asked whether they would prefer to go back to their usual work hours for
80 per cent of their usual salary.
3. Economic impacts
Furloughing is only effective if it limits inefficient separations. To obtain a
better sense of how individuals perceived their future labour market outcomes,
we asked respondents how likely they thought it was that they would lose their
job before 1 August 2020, on a scale of 0–100 per cent chance. In our second
survey, we also asked respondents how likely it was that they would look for a
new job in the next 12 months, again on a scale of 0–100 per cent chance.
22Respondents who had no job in the week before the survey were asked analogous questions about their
last job.
23Gardiner and Slaughter, 2020.
24Both our surveys took place before the announcement of flexible furlough.
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FIGURE 1
Share of furloughed workers by region
Note: The horizontal bars show the average share of employees who were furloughed on the survey date for
each region. The black bars represent 95 per cent confidence intervals. Survey responses for the April and
May survey waves are pooled in this figure.
IV. Who was furloughed?
In our sample of UK employees, 35 per cent of those in work in February
report being currently furloughed from their main job. This figure is consistent
with the best available UK administrative records. Official records show that
9.4 million claims were made to the furloughing scheme by late June
2020. Assuming that each worker is only furloughed from a single job, this
corresponds to 34 per cent of employees.25 In Figure 1, we exhibit the share
of furloughed workers by region. The share of workers furloughed across
regions varies from 32 per cent in the North West to 45 per cent in Northern
Ireland.
There is a lot of variation in the extent to which employers made use of
the furloughing scheme across both industries and occupations. In Figure 2,
we report the share of furloughed employees by occupation (top) and industry
25The UK Office for National Statistics estimates there were 27.7million employees in their February
2020 labour market bulletin. See https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/
employmentandemployeetypes/bulletins/employmentintheuk/february2020.
© 2020 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
Furloughing 601
FIGURE 2
Share of furloughed workers by occupation and industry
Note: The horizontal bars show the average share of employees who were furloughed on the survey date
for each occupation (top) and industry (bottom). The black bars represent 95 per cent confidence intervals.
Survey responses for the April and May survey waves are pooled in this figure.
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(bottom) when pooling our April and May survey waves.26 For occupations,
the share of employees who reported having been furloughed ranges from 61
per cent for ‘Architecture and Engineering’ to 19 per cent for ‘Healthcare
Support’. Across industries, 76 per cent of those employees in February
working in ‘Mining and Quarrying’ report having been furloughed, against
a figure of 8 per cent for ‘Public Administration and Defence’.
One might have expected the share of furloughed employees to have been
greatest in ‘Accommodation and Food Service Activities’ given that this
industry has been particularly affected by sector-specific lockdowns. While 53
per cent of employees working in this industry report being furloughed, which
is higher than average, job loss has also been particularly high (29 per cent).
In contrast, in many utility industries (e.g. ‘Water Supply etc.’, ‘Electricity,
Gas, Steam etc.’), a large proportion of workers have been furloughed but
few have lost their job.27 Figure 3 shows the relationship between the share
of employees that lost their jobs and the share that were furloughed across
occupations (left) and industries (right). While there is a significant positive
relationship between the rates of job loss and furlough, there is considerable
heterogeneity in the furloughing rate amongst occupations and industries with
similar levels of job loss.
Turning to differences in the probability of being furloughed by
background and job characteristics, Figure 4 shows that workers with unstable
work arrangements were significantly more likely to be put on furlough. In
particular, 48 per cent of workers with variable hours were put on furlough
by May 2020, against a corresponding figure of 29 per cent of workers with
fixed-hour contracts. Workers under the age of 35 were significantly more
likely to be put on furlough by May 2020 compared with workers aged 35
or above.
In columns (1)–(3) of Table 1, we consider which workers were furloughed
within the framework of a linear probability model (LPM). In column (1),
we see that occupation and industry are important determinants of whether
an employee is furloughed or not: together with region and time fixed effects,
they explain 10 per cent of the variation in furloughing. Job characteristics are
important predictors of furloughing.28 Throughout all specifications, workers
on variable-hour contracts and those who are paid by the hour are much more
likely to have been furloughed, while those who can do a greater percentage of
their work tasks from home have been less likely to be furloughed. Controlling
26Most occupations and industries saw little change in the share of furloughed workers across these
survey waves (see Figure B.1 in the online Appendix). Meaningful easing of lockdown did not begin until
4 July in many sectors.
27Figure B.2 in the online Appendix shows the share of employees that have lost their job, have been
furloughed, and have remained employed and not furloughed by occupation and industry.
28We note that some differences between regions remain significant, even when controlling for job and
individual characteristics.
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TABLE 1
Furloughing probability: job and individual characteristics
LPM Multinomial logit
Furloughed Furloughed Lost Job
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age:
30–39 −0.1312*** −0.0806*** −0.4575*** −0.3773***
(0.0172) (0.0171) (0.0845) (0.1324)
40–49 −0.1984*** −0.1164*** −0.6491*** −0.4955***
(0.0183) (0.0187) (0.0961) (0.1464)
50–59 −0.2695*** −0.1642*** −0.9872*** −0.6940***
(0.0200) (0.0206) (0.1187) (0.1703)
60+ −0.1982*** −0.1097*** −0.6712*** −0.7919***
(0.0305) (0.0306) (0.1620) (0.2564)
University degree −0.0382*** −0.0038 −0.0107 −0.0100
(0.0128) (0.0138) (0.0738) (0.1129)
Female −0.0239* 0.0279** 0.2027*** 0.3127***
(0.0128) (0.0136) (0.0721) (0.1132)
Income 2019 (£10,000s) 0.0063** 0.0298** −0.0034
(0.0029) (0.0145) (0.0263)
Temporary contract −0.1262*** −0.3080*** 0.9074***
(0.0223) (0.1154) (0.1389)
Variable hours (worker) 0.0758*** 0.4029*** 0.2638*
(0.0177) (0.0890) (0.1415)
Variable hours (firm) 0.0682*** 0.3822*** 0.1488
(0.0209) (0.1051) (0.1505)
Non-salaried contract 0.1181*** 0.5582*** 0.1051
(0.0161) (0.0793) (0.1211)
Work from home −0.0554*** −0.6065*** −1.8480***
(0.0201) (0.1116) (0.1851)
No paid sick leave −0.0439*** 0.0295 0.8219***
(0.0167) (0.0879) (0.1136)
Constant 0.4984*** 0.5848*** 0.5317*** 0.3591 −1.6383**
(0.0854) (0.0275) (0.0906) (0.3965) (0.6781)
Observations 5,522 5,540 5,476 5,476
R2 0.1008 0.0465 0.1350
Region F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation F.E. Yes No Yes Yes
Industry F.E. Yes No Yes Yes
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. Columns (1)–(3) report linear
probability models where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
respondent reports that they are currently furloughed from their main job, and 0 otherwise. Columns (4)
and (5) report the coefficients of a multinomial logit model where the omitted category is ‘employed and
not furloughed’.
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FIGURE 3
Share of workers furloughed and share that have lost their job across occupations
and industries
Note: Each circle represents either an occupation or industry, with the size proportional to the number of
survey respondents who report that either their current or last job was in that occupation or industry. The
line gives the line of best fit. Survey responses for the April and May survey waves are pooled in this figure.
for job characteristics, as well as a broad set of fixed effects, we find that
women were 3 percentage points (pp) more likely to have been furloughed
compared with men. Moreover, workers on variable-hour contracts, if either
the firm or the worker decides on the schedule, are also significantly more
likely to have been furloughed. The probability of being furloughed is u-
shaped in terms of age, with young workers below the age of 30 being the
most likely to have been furloughed.
These models ignore the fact that workers can be in three states: furloughed,
employed and not furloughed, and not in work. Columns (4) and (5) analyse
worker outcomes in a multinomial framework, where ‘employed and not
furloughed’ is the omitted category. Similar patterns arise. Notably, women
are significantly more likely to have been furloughed or lost their job. Younger
workers and those employed on variable-hour contracts are less likely to be
in non-furloughed employment. While workers on temporary contracts have
been less likely to be furloughed, they are more likely to have been laid off.
© 2020 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
Furloughing 605
FIGURE 4
Share of furloughed workers by individual and job characteristics
Note: The graph shows the share of workers that are currently furloughed by different individual and job
characteristics. Black bars represent 95 per cent confidence intervals. Survey responses for the April and
May survey waves are pooled in this figure. ‘Below av. WFH’ are employees who can do less than average
tasks from home, while ‘Above av. WFH’ are employees who can do more than average tasks from home.
‘<£30k’ refers to respondents with a yearly gross individual income below £30,000 in 2019, while ‘£30k+’
refers to those earning more. ‘Varied’ refers to respondents with variable-hour contracts, while ‘fixed’ refers
to those with fixed-hour contracts.
Those on higher incomes are more likely to have been furloughed relative to
remaining in employment or losing their job.
V. Furloughing terms
Heterogeneity in the terms on which workers are furloughed arises along
several dimensions. Did the worker or employer initiate the decision to be
furloughed? Are worker incomes ‘topped-up’ by employers beyond the 80
per cent paid for by the government? Do employees continue to work while
furloughed even though it is against the terms of the scheme?29
Consider first the decision to be put on furlough. We asked respondents to
identify whether the decision to be furloughed was ‘fully [their] employer’s
decision’ to ‘fully [their] decision’ on a five-point scale.30 Figure 5 shows
29Both our survey waves took place before the introduction of flexible furloughing.
30See Section III.
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FIGURE 5
Share of furloughed employees who asked to be furloughed
Note: The graph shows the share of currently furloughed employees who initiated furloughing. We construct
a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent reports that they had an equal say in the
furloughing decision, or the furloughing was initiated mostly or fully by them. Mothers or fathers are
defined as respondents who have at least one child living in the household. The sample is restricted to
respondents to the May survey wave.
whether an employee had at least an ‘equal say’ in the decision to go on
furlough by gender and by whether the respondent has children. We construct
a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent reports that they
had an equal say in the furloughing decision, or the furloughing was initiated
mostly or fully by them. Women are more likely to have initiated furloughing
and this is mainly driven by women with children at home who are much
more likely to have initiated furloughing than men with children. These results
highlight an important gender gap in the impact of the pandemic and are
consistent with findings that mothers are spending significantly more time on
childcare activities than men during the pandemic, at the expense of paid work
time.31
In Table 2, we look at which workers are more likely to have initiated the
furloughing in a regression framework. In column (1), we find that women are
4 pp more likely to have asked to be put on furlough, compared with men.
31Adams-Prassl et al., 2020c; Andrew et al., 2020; Biroli et al., 2020; Farré et al., 2020; Sevilla and
Smith, 2020.




All Parents No children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age:
30–39 −0.0467 −0.0291 −0.0797** −0.0501 0.0151 0.0209
(0.0316) (0.0315) (0.0403) (0.0431) (0.0571) (0.0539)
40–49 −0.0277 0.0246 −0.0333 0.0115 −0.0217 0.0401
(0.0371) (0.0372) (0.0502) (0.0510) (0.0533) (0.0550)
50–59 −0.0606 0.0155 −0.1148* −0.0417 −0.0140 0.0251
(0.0409) (0.0422) (0.0647) (0.0751) (0.0577) (0.0610)
60+ 0.0253 0.1064* 0.3032 0.4504** 0.0290 0.0680
(0.0572) (0.0594) (0.1988) (0.1988) (0.0653) (0.0692)
University degree 0.0293 0.0338 0.0549 0.0387 0.0047 0.0192
(0.0257) (0.0272) (0.0338) (0.0392) (0.0405) (0.0425)
Female 0.0432* 0.0537* 0.0711** 0.1048*** 0.0240 −0.0176
(0.0254) (0.0278) (0.0351) (0.0377) (0.0382) (0.0445)
Income 2019 (£10,000s) 0.0068 0.0066 0.0142
(0.0058) (0.0077) (0.0110)
Temporary contract 0.0273 0.0662 0.0224
(0.0445) (0.0614) (0.0676)
Variable hours (worker) 0.0817** 0.0545 0.1924***
(0.0342) (0.0425) (0.0666)
Variable hours (firm) 0.1394*** 0.1437*** 0.1277**
(0.0368) (0.0512) (0.0566)
Non-salaried contract 0.0509* 0.0132 0.0719
(0.0283) (0.0398) (0.0456)
Work from home −0.0174 0.0029 −0.0676
(0.0403) (0.0632) (0.0566)
No paid sick leave −0.0624** 0.0016 −0.1213***
(0.0313) (0.0549) (0.0403)
Constant 0.0984** 0.2809 0.1051 0.2381 0.0894 0.9117***
(0.0501) (0.2019) (0.0691) (0.2055) (0.0746) (0.1140)
Observations 968 963 537 533 431 430
R2 0.0203 0.1248 0.0560 0.1636 0.0244 0.2122
Region F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation F.E. No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry F.E. No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. The sample is
restricted to furloughed respondents to the May survey wave. The dependent variable is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the respondent had an equal say in the decision to initiate the furloughing or if
the furloughing was mostly the respondent’s decision. The dependent variable takes the value of 0 if the
furloughing was initiated fully or mostly by the employer.
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The coefficient on the female dummy remains stable when controlling for
occupation and industry fixed effects, as well as a number of job characteristics
(column (2)). We then examine whether childcare responsibilities might affect
a worker’s decision to initiate furloughing. When restricting the sample to
parents (columns (3) and (4)), we find that women are almost 10 pp more
likely to initiate the furloughing, whereas we do not find a gender gap in who
initiates furloughing in the group of respondents without children (columns (5)
and (6)).
We also find that those on variable-hour contracts are more likely to have
initiated the decision to be furloughed. This is especially so for those where
the employer, rather than the worker, has the discretion to determine working
hours: those with employer-determined hours are 14 pp more likely to have
initiated furlough than those with a fixed-hours schedule. This does not seem
related to childcare responsibilities but could be related to more sensitivity to
uncertainty during the pandemic.32 Amongst those without children, workers
who set their own working hours are more likely to have initiated the decision.
In principle, the furloughing scheme could result in less pay inequality as
it compresses the wage distribution from above by capping the maximum
monthly amount at £2,500. However, employers have the choice to top up
salaries of furloughed workers above the 80 per cent state contribution or the
maximum limit of £2,500, whichever is lowest. In our April survey wave,
we asked furloughed respondents whether their employer topped up their
salary beyond the level provided by the government. We find that 70 per
cent of furloughed workers receive a discretionary salary top-up by their
employer. However, workers on higher incomes are more likely to be topped-
up, reducing the inequality-reducing effect of the scheme. Figure 6 also shows
that (unconditionally) men are more likely to receive discretionary payments.
In the first two columns of Table 3, we analyse heterogeneity in salary
top-ups. In column (1),we see that the probability of receiving a top-up is
decreasing in age and 10 pp lower for women. In column (2), we examine
heterogeneity in the probability of receiving a top-up across the income
distribution and by job characteristics. Workers with higher (individual)
incomes in 2019 are more likely to receive a top-up when furloughed.
Therefore, the equalising effect of the furloughing scheme is partially
mitigated by employers’ decisions to top up their employees’ salaries. While
the coefficient on gender is insignificant with the full set of controls, we note
that it remains positive and significant if only income is controlled for; it is the
inclusion of the full suite of job characteristics that reduces the magnitude of
the effects. Workers with self-determined hours are 5 pp more likely to have
received a top-up, perhaps reflecting a reward for greater autonomy (discussed
in more detail below).
32Interactions between gender and hours arrangements are insignificant.
© 2020 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
Furloughing 609
TABLE 3
Terms on which furloughed
Salary top-up Positive work hours % usual hours
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age:
30–39 −0.0227 −0.0042 −0.0802*** −0.0648** −0.0894*** −0.0676**
(0.0320) (0.0308) (0.0277) (0.0252) (0.0332) (0.0307)
40–49 −0.1353*** −0.0396 −0.2355*** −0.1578*** −0.2789*** −0.1854***
(0.0405) (0.0399) (0.0331) (0.0313) (0.0352) (0.0336)
50–59 −0.1980*** −0.0009 −0.3418*** −0.1841*** −0.4054*** −0.2248***
(0.0617) (0.0612) (0.0441) (0.0440) (0.0415) (0.0427)
60+ −0.3038*** −0.1878* −0.3981*** −0.2469*** −0.3775*** −0.2114***
(0.1086) (0.1078) (0.0533) (0.0593) (0.0538) (0.0591)
University degree 0.0158 −0.0765*** 0.0696*** −0.0160 −0.0012 −0.0642**
(0.0280) (0.0287) (0.0237) (0.0233) (0.0262) (0.0254)
Female −0.0968*** −0.0104 −0.1949*** −0.0975*** −0.1944*** −0.0952***
(0.0274) (0.0289) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0253) (0.0253)
Income 2019 (£10,000s) 0.0138*** 0.0154*** 0.0148***
(0.0049) (0.0040) (0.0053)
Temporary contract −0.0243 −0.0177 −0.0307
(0.0444) (0.0357) (0.0396)
Variable hours (worker) 0.0536* 0.1020*** 0.1000***
(0.0325) (0.0265) (0.0317)
Variable hours (firm) −0.0263 0.0472 0.0507
(0.0379) (0.0302) (0.0353)
Non-salaried contract 0.0599** 0.0590** 0.1206***
(0.0294) (0.0244) (0.0287)
Work from home 0.2878*** 0.3272*** 0.3690***
(0.0483) (0.0402) (0.0453)
No paid sick leave −0.3376*** −0.2128*** −0.1928***
(0.0431) (0.0306) (0.0301)
Constant 0.8230*** 0.6840*** 0.8369*** 0.7402*** −0.1710*** −0.6226***
(0.0547) (0.1053) (0.0474) (0.0860) (0.0535) (0.1045)
Observations 1142 1099 1481 1469 1481 1469
R2 0.0541 0.2514 0.1835 0.3774 0.1663 0.3589
Region F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave F.E. – – Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation F.E. No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry F.E. No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. In columns
(1) and (2), the sample is restricted to respondents to the April survey wave who are currently furloughed
in their main job. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent
reports that their employer has topped up their salary beyond the 80 per cent funded by the government.
Columns (3)–(6) pool responses from the April and May survey waves and restrict the sample to those
who are currently furloughed in their main job and report having only one job. The dependent variable in
columns (3) and (4) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent reports positive work
hours in the previous week, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is the proportion
of weekly hours worked in the previous week compared with typical hours in February.
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FIGURE 6
Share of furloughed workers receiving top-up by individual and job characteristics
Note: The graph shows the share of workers that are currently furloughed by different individual and job
characteristics who report having their salary topped up beyond the 80 per cent subsidy provided by the
government. Black bars represent 95 per cent confidence intervals. The sample is restricted to respondents
to the April survey wave. ‘Below av. WFH’ are employees who can do less than average tasks from home,
while ‘Above av. WFH’ are employees who can do more than average tasks from home. ‘<£30k’ refers
to respondents with a yearly gross individual income below £30,000 in 2019, while ‘£30k+’ are those
earning more. ‘Varied’ refers to respondents with variable-hour contracts, while ‘fixed’ refers to those with
fixed-hour contracts.
At the time of our surveys, working was forbidden while currently
furloughed. However, 19 per cent of employees in our sample report being
explicitly asked to work by their employer despite being currently furloughed.
In Figure B.3, we show how this share breaks down by occupation and
industry.33 There is large variation in the share of furloughed workers who are
asked to provide work across occupations. While 44 per cent of furloughed
employees working in ‘Computer and Mathematical’ occupations have been
asked to work while on furlough, the corresponding share for ‘Transportation
and Material Moving’ is 3 per cent. Similarly, 35 per cent of workers in the
‘Information and Communication’ industry report having been asked to work
while on furlough, against 8 per cent for ‘Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing’.
Many more furloughed employees report working even if not explicitly
compelled to do so by their employer. Two-thirds of furloughed workers (who
33We exclude employees who report they are being formally rotated into work.
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FIGURE 7
Percentage of usual hours worked while furloughed by the percentage of tasks that
can be done from home
Note: The graph shows the percentage of typical work hours worked in the previous week by respondents
who are currently furloughed, by the percentage of tasks that can be done from home. Survey responses for
the April and May survey waves are pooled in this figure.
only had one job) report having worked a positive amount of hours over the
last week. The regression models reported in columns (3)–(6) of Table 3 reveal
that women, older workers, and those without paid sick leave are less likely
to have continued to work on furlough. Workers on higher incomes but also
those on variable-hour contracts have been more likely to continue working.
Those with the flexibility of self-determined hours (as opposed to those whose
schedule is determined by their employer) have been more likely to continue
working whilst on furlough, suggesting the importance of worker autonomy in
the decision to work whilst furloughed.34
Workers who can do a large percentage of their jobs from home are
especially likely to have continued working whilst furloughed (see columns (4)
and (6) of Table 3). Figure 7 shows relative hours worked by the percentage of
tasks that can be done from home, separately for men (left) and women (right).
34Mas and Pallais, 2020.
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The relationship is striking. Those who can do the majority of their tasks
from home are especially likely to have continued working the same or more
hours than usual (orange) while on furlough. The gradient is somewhat less
striking for women, perhaps because of caring responsibilities. In Figure B.4,
we plot the mean and median hours worked amongst furloughed workers
by the percentage of tasks that can be done from home, which confirms the
patterns.
On average, including zeros, furloughed workers worked 15 hours (10
hours median). While still substantial, this is a decline in work hours of 44
per cent on average compared with a typical week in February. Although
some of these workers might have been furloughed very close to our survey
date and therefore might not have been furloughed in the previous week
when they report working a positive amount of hours, it is unlikely that this
scenario applies to a large fraction of respondents. In Table3, we show how the
number of hours worked, despite being furloughed, relates to individual and
job characteristics. When controlling for job and individual characteristics,
as well as region, industry and occupation fixed effects, we find that women,
older workers, those on lower incomes and those without paid sick leave are
working fewer hours while currently furloughed.
We note that these patterns cannot be explained by the formal rotation of
employees on and off furlough: the CJRS originally allowed workers to work
one week in every four-week period. In our April survey wave, we explicitly
asked workers whether their employer was formally rotating them back into
work. When we restrict our sample to furloughed employees with a single job
who report that their employer is not formally rotating them back into work,
we still find that over 60 per cent of furloughed employees report doing some
work, with a 42 per cent reduction in weekly hours on average. Table B.1
replicates columns (4) and (6) of Table 3, restricting the sample to furloughed
employees who are not being formally rotated into work.
VI. Returning to work and expectations for the future
At the time of writing, consumers are being encouraged to leave their homes
to spend on the high street and workers are being actively encouraged to
return to work.35 In our May survey wave, we asked furloughed workers
whether they would prefer going back to work for 80 per cent of their
salary instead of staying on furlough. On average, 61 per cent of respondents
said they would prefer to return to work from furlough even at 80 per
cent of pay. However, there are large differences in workers’ preferences
across occupations and industries (see Figure 8). Workers in service-sector
35See, for example, the introduction of the ‘Eat Out to Help Out’ scheme on 8 July 2020: https://www.
gov.uk/guidance/get-a-discount-with-the-eat-out-to-help-out-scheme.
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FIGURE 8
Would accept pay cut to return to work, by occupation and industry
Note: The graph shows the share of currently furloughed workers who would prefer to go back to work for
80 per cent of their salary instead of staying on furlough, by occupation and industry. Black bars represent
95 per cent confidence intervals. The sample is restricted to furloughed respondents of the May survey wave.
occupations (e.g. ‘Food Preparation and Serving’ or ‘Sales and Related
Occupations’), are significantly less likely to be willing to return to work
compared with workers in ‘Computer and Mathematical’ or ‘Architecture and
Engineering’ occupations.
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In Table 4, we analyse the determinants of workers’ willingness to return
to work. Column (1) shows that women are almost 13 pp less likely to
report being willing to go back to work for a 20 per cent salary cut, and
willingness to return to work decreases with age. In column (2), we analyse
heterogeneities in workers’ willingness to return to work for a pay cut
along the income distribution and for individuals with different contractual
arrangements. Workers who can do a larger share of their tasks from home are
17 pp more likely to be willing to go back to work instead of being on furlough.
Importantly, individuals employed under variable-hour work arrangements are
significantly more likely to be willing to take a pay cut and return to work,
especially for workers who have control of the number of hours they work.
This suggests that furloughed workers might value other intangible aspects of
their work beyond the monetary compensation.
Employees who do not have access to paid sick leave beyond the statutory
minimum are 13 pp less likely to be willing to return to work for 80 per cent of
their salary, even when a rich set of job characteristics are controlled for. This
highlights an important trade-off between health and economic risks; workers
without an adequate safety net appear to be more cautious about exposing
themselves to health risks at work. Finally, in column (3), we include whether
an employee initiated the decision to be furloughed, but we do not find any
significant effect.
Despite the government’s effort to cushion the negative impact of the
coronavirus crisis on the labour market, many workers fear losing their job
before August,36 and workers who have been put on furlough may feel
perilously close to being laid off. In Table 5, we look at workers’ expectations
about future labour market outcomes. We restrict the sample to individuals
who are currently in work and we regress workers’ self-reported probability
of losing their job before August on individual and job characteristics, and an
indicator for whether they are currently on furlough. Column (1) shows that
the expected probability of losing one’s job is decreasing in age, and higher
for men and workers with a university degree. Column (2) echoes our findings
on returning to work and shows that workers with less secure job contracts are
more pessimistic about their future labour market outcomes. Notably, workers
who can do a large share of their tasks from home find it more likely that they
will lose their job before August. In column (3), we examine heterogeneities
in the perceived probability of job loss by whether or not workers are currently
furloughed. Furloughed workers are much more likely to fear losing their jobs:
on average, they report a 15 pp higher likelihood of losing their job before
August, controlling for a broad range of individual and job characteristics.
Among furloughed workers, those who can do a larger share of their tasks
from home are more pessimistic about future employment (see column (4)).
36Adams-Prassl et al., 2020c.
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TABLE 4
Prefer to return to work for 80 per cent of pay
(1) (2) (3)
Age:
30–39 −0.0300 −0.0423 −0.0419
(0.0412) (0.0398) (0.0397)
40–49 −0.1293** −0.0614 −0.0617
(0.0506) (0.0512) (0.0512)
50–59 −0.1316** −0.0031 −0.0036
(0.0609) (0.0620) (0.0621)
60+ −0.1845** −0.0545 −0.0555
(0.0732) (0.0798) (0.0798)
University degree 0.0535 −0.0024 −0.0027
(0.0347) (0.0361) (0.0361)
Female −0.1302*** −0.0442 −0.0446
(0.0342) (0.0349) (0.0349)
Income 2019 (£10,000s) 0.0163** 0.0163**
(0.0068) (0.0068)
Temporary contract −0.0008 −0.0006
(0.0600) (0.0600)
Variable hours (worker) 0.1807*** 0.1797***
(0.0404) (0.0406)
Variable hours (firm) 0.1142** 0.1130**
(0.0487) (0.0490)
Non-salaried contract 0.0983** 0.0982**
(0.0391) (0.0392)
Work from home 0.1709*** 0.1710***
(0.0621) (0.0621)




Constant 0.6823*** 0.4319* 0.4294*
(0.0732) (0.2218) (0.2220)
Observations 806 801 801
R2 0.0744 0.2690 0.2690
Region F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Occupation F.E. No Yes Yes
Industry F.E. No Yes Yes
Note: OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. The sample is
restricted to currently furloughed respondents in the May survey wave. The dependent variable is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent would prefer to go back to work for 80 per cent of their
salary instead of staying on furlough, and 0 otherwise.
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TABLE 5
Perceived probability of job loss
In work Furloughed Not furloughed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age:
30–39 −0.0316*** −0.0077 0.0073 0.0445*** −0.0229
(0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0151) (0.0142)
40–49 −0.1229*** −0.0659*** −0.0448*** −0.0097 −0.0663***
(0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0195) (0.0147)
50–59 −0.2033*** −0.1206*** −0.0909*** −0.0409 −0.1077***
(0.0119) (0.0126) (0.0123) (0.0252) (0.0150)
60+ −0.2107*** −0.1343*** −0.1128*** −0.0581* −0.1341***
(0.0177) (0.0183) (0.0175) (0.0350) (0.0200)
University degree 0.0172** 0.0089 0.0094 0.0199 0.0091
(0.0082) (0.0086) (0.0083) (0.0138) (0.0103)
Female −0.0581*** −0.0095 −0.0156* −0.0370*** −0.0032
(0.0082) (0.0086) (0.0082) (0.0138) (0.0101)
Income 2019 (£10,000s) 0.0080*** 0.0072*** 0.0047* 0.0045*
(0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Temporary contract 0.0721*** 0.0818*** 0.0308 0.1154***
(0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0192) (0.0216)
Variable hours (worker) 0.0493*** 0.0359*** 0.0165 0.0421***
(0.0109) (0.0106) (0.0160) (0.0140)
Variable hours (firm) 0.0483*** 0.0360*** 0.0242 0.0484***
(0.0130) (0.0126) (0.0181) (0.0178)
Non-salaried contract 0.0531*** 0.0348*** 0.0419*** 0.0209*
(0.0098) (0.0094) (0.0142) (0.0124)
Work from home 0.1395*** 0.1575*** 0.3018*** 0.0815***
(0.0133) (0.0127) (0.0254) (0.0145)
No paid sick leave −0.0040 −0.0039 −0.0201 0.0042
(0.0109) (0.0106) (0.0186) (0.0128)
Currently furloughed 0.1554***
(0.0087)
Constant 0.3782*** 0.2378*** 0.1493*** 0.3065*** 0.1322**
(0.0172) (0.0491) (0.0451) (0.0645) (0.0561)
Observations 4,908 4,877 4,877 1,892 2,985
R2 0.0920 0.2178 0.2723 0.2563 0.1814
Region F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wave F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. The sample in
columns (1)–(3) is restricted to those in work in the April and May survey waves. The sample in column (4)
is restricted to those currently on furlough, and in column (5) it is restricted to employees not on furlough.
The dependent variable is the respondent’s subjective probability of losing their job before 1 August 2020
on a 0–1 scale.
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For these workers, social-distancing restrictions on labour supply are unlikely
to be the only reason for a low-productivity match, and thus firm or demand
factors could be stronger drivers of subjective expectations of job loss.
In Table 6, we use data from our May survey wave to examine differences
in workers’ subjective probability of looking for a new job in the next year.
Looking at individual and job characteristics, we find that older workers and
workers without a university degree are less likely to look for a new job,
whereas workers on temporary contracts report significantly higher likelihoods
of job search. Column (3) further shows that furloughed workers are around
10 pp more likely to be currently looking for a job, even when controlling for
individual and job characteristics. Interestingly, in all specifications, workers
who do not have access to sick pay beyond the statutory minimum report
between 4 and 9 pp higher likelihoods of looking for a new job. In column (4),
we additionally control for workers’ self-reported probability of job loss
before August. As expected, fears of job loss strongly correlate with search
behaviour: workers who are more pessimistic about their abilities to retain their
job in the short term are significantly more likely to report that they will be
looking for a job in the next year. Moreover, once we control for the subjective
probability of job loss, we find that the coefficient on the furlough dummy
becomes three times smaller, but that it is still significant and around 3 pp.
Finally, in column (5), we restrict the sample to workers who reported being
furloughed at the time of data collection, and we find that the associations
between age, education and on-the-job search survive within the sample of
furloughed workers.
VII. Implications for policy design
Given the high likelihood of future waves of COVID-19 infection, it is crucial
quickly to evaluate the design of the CJRS. It is clear that any future UK policy
should allow employees to work on a part-time basis from the introduction of
the scheme. The vast majority of workers report that they can do some of their
work tasks from home,37 and the majority of workers continued to do some
work while on furlough even when this was banned by the scheme. While
this has likely introduced inequality between firms that fully complied with
the scheme and those that did not, having furloughed employees continue to
work is likely to have been welfare-improving by allowing economic activity
to continue.
Preventing work on furlough might also have slowed the adoption of new
technologies to enable working from home: why invest in changing work
practices if your employees are not supposed to work? In Adams-Prassl et al.
(2020b), we show that improvements in the ability to work from home were
37Adams-Prassl et al., 2020b.
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TABLE 6




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age:
30–39 −0.0334* −0.0104 −0.0058 −0.0079 −0.0340 0.0025
(0.0180) (0.0182) (0.0180) (0.0172) (0.0254) (0.0238)
40–49 −0.0743*** −0.0330 −0.0243 −0.0038 0.0009 0.0023
(0.0205) (0.0208) (0.0206) (0.0195) (0.0320) (0.0256)
50–59 −0.1893*** −0.1276*** −0.1145*** −0.0821*** −0.1309*** −0.0675**
(0.0217) (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0210) (0.0373) (0.0265)
60+ −0.3143*** −0.2536*** −0.2465*** −0.2069*** −0.2133*** −0.2019***
(0.0265) (0.0272) (0.0268) (0.0240) (0.0430) (0.0309)
University degree 0.0531*** 0.0631*** 0.0623*** 0.0607*** 0.0418* 0.0683***
(0.0140) (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0137) (0.0220) (0.0180)
Female −0.0146 −0.0099 −0.0139 −0.0002 0.0008 −0.0038
(0.0136) (0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0134) (0.0221) (0.0174)
Income 2019 (£10,000s) −0.0033 −0.0034 −0.0064** −0.0058 −0.0078**
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0035)
Temporary contract 0.0735*** 0.0774*** 0.0479** 0.0123 0.0682**
(0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0222) (0.0331) (0.0314)
Variable hours (worker) 0.0400** 0.0317* 0.0118 0.0490* −0.0139
(0.0183) (0.0181) (0.0163) (0.0261) (0.0219)
Variable hours (firm) 0.0281 0.0221 0.0032 0.0228 0.0049
(0.0217) (0.0216) (0.0203) (0.0319) (0.0286)
Non-salaried contract 0.0371** 0.0269 0.0046 −0.0109 0.0128
(0.0166) (0.0164) (0.0152) (0.0245) (0.0206)
Work from home 0.1465*** 0.1623*** 0.0918*** 0.0588 0.1071***
(0.0217) (0.0214) (0.0206) (0.0395) (0.0250)
No paid sick leave 0.0706*** 0.0671*** 0.0615*** 0.0840*** 0.0423*
(0.0186) (0.0184) (0.0172) (0.0286) (0.0224)
Currently furloughed 0.0964*** 0.0291**
(0.0145) (0.0137)
Perceived prob. of job loss 0.4604*** 0.4643*** 0.4664***
(0.0249) (0.0429) (0.0315)
Constant 0.4394*** 0.2650*** 0.2114*** 0.1335** 0.1977** 0.1541*
(0.0289) (0.0808) (0.0795) (0.0575) (0.0855) (0.0814)
Observations 2,292 2,282 2,282 2,278 800 1,478
R2 0.1086 0.1879 0.2029 0.3116 0.3438 0.2882
Region F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry F.E. No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. The sample in
columns (1)–(6) is restricted to those in work in the May survey wave. The sample in columns (6) and (7)
is restricted to those currently on furlough and not on furlough, respectively, in the May survey wave. The
dependent variable is the respondent’s subjective probability of looking for a new job in the next year.
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the largest in occupations that already had the largest share of workers who
could do all tasks from home at the beginning of the crisis. It is plausible
that the capacity to work from home could have increased in a wider set
of occupations had the furloughing scheme placed fewer restrictions on
working.
At the time of writing, the UK government is resisting any extension to
the CJRS beyond October 2020. Our results suggest that greater flexibility
in the ending of the scheme could be required. Crucially, the duration of the
furloughing scheme should be sensitive to continued disruption in schooling
and childcare. There is a growing body of evidence that women, and mothers
in particular, have been especially hard hit economically by the pandemic.38
Even mothers who can work from home face more interruptions to their work
time from domestic care responsibilities.39 In this paper, we show that mothers
have been more likely to request to be furloughed but there is no gender gap
for childless workers. There is a real risk that mothers could be forced out
of the labour market if the furloughing scheme ends without viable childcare
options being available.
Flexibility in the removal of the scheme across different occupations is
also warranted. Our results suggest that support for jobs that can be done
from home should be phased out more quickly. Furloughed workers who
can do a large proportion of their jobs from home are relatively pessimistic
about their chance of keeping their job in the medium run. For these workers,
social-distancing measures are unlikely to be the only reason for a low-
productivity match and they should not be prevented from moving to more
viable firms. However, in jobs that are relatively difficult to do from home,
labour supply restrictions from social-distancing measures should be taken
into consideration, as the match might be efficient outside a pandemic.
Returning to work outside the home brings more opportunities for exposure
to, and transmission of, the virus. While the majority of furloughed workers
would prefer to return to work even at 80 per cent of their usual pay, workers
without employer-provided sick pay have a significantly lower willingness to
pay to return to work. Worryingly, we find that workers without additional
sick pay are significantly more likely to continue to work even with mild
coronavirus symptoms (Table B.2 in the online Appendix). The UK has
one of the least generous statutory sick pay schemes in Europe, which was
described as ‘manifestly inadequate’ by the European Committee of Social
Rights (2017). Complementing findings from causal studies of changes in sick
pay coverage,40 our results suggest that the provision of more generous sick
pay could help to support the economic recovery by encouraging workers to
38Adams-Prassl et al., 2020c; Andrew et al., 2020; Benzeval et al., 2020.
39See, for example, Adams (2020) and Andrew et al. (2020).
40Marie and Vall Castelló, 2020; Pichler and Ziebarth, 2020.
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return to work while infection rates remain above zero, and supporting sick
workers to take time off work when they pose a risk to others.
VIII. Conclusion
In this paper, we exploit survey data from the UK to document differences
in furloughing under the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme across job and
individual characteristics. We show that, while a significant proportion of
workers in our sample are currently on furlough, there are large differences in
the use of the furloughing scheme across industries and occupations. Further,
we document that women, younger workers, and workers with alternative work
arrangements have been more likely to be put on furlough.
Relatedly, we provide evidence of differences in the terms under which
employees have been furloughed. In particular, our analysis shows that a
significant proportion of workers who are on furlough still report working
a positive amount of hours. Further, the number of hours worked while on
furlough is increasing in the share of tasks that workers can perform from
home, and is higher for respondents whose employer agreed to top up their
wage beyond the state contribution of 80 per cent. Finally, we show that
being on furlough is associated with higher self-reported probabilities of job
loss before August for respondents who are in paid work at the time of data
collection, and a higher likelihood of searching for a new job.
Our results highlight the benefits of allowing employees to work while
enrolled in a STW scheme and the need for flexibility in the duration
of government support across occupations and in response to childcare
disruption. Finally, our results suggest that the provision of more generous
sick pay could help to support the economic recovery by encouraging workers
to return to work while infection rates remain above zero, and supporting sick
workers to take time off work when they pose a risk to others.
For future research it will be important, but challenging, to understand what
would have happened to the UK economy under alternative policy responses
or with no furloughing scheme at all. This understanding could contribute to
the design of STW schemes that are kept in place to help stabilise the economy
in response to large negative exogenous shocks with mechanisms that contain
uncertainty and increase efficiency.
Supporting information
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting
Information section at the end of the article.
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